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The Courts 
and Grant Reform: 
A Time for Action 
By George D. Brown 
Beyond a doubt, there is a “law” of 
federal grants. Its most obvious man- 
ifestation is the hundreds-probably 
thousands-of federal court decisions 
concerning the award or administration 
of federal financial assistance. Indeed, 
the judiciary has assumed such a sub- 
stantial role in the operation of the 
intergovernmental aid system that it 
would seem difficult to understand the 
functioning of that system-let alone 
reform it-without an appreciation of 
6 what the courts are doing, and why. 
Yet, the current intergovernmental reform efforts 
devote little or no attention to the judicial role. The 
same is true of many analyses of the grant system 
and its problems. This article raises the question of 
whether such “benign neglect” is sound public pol- 
icy, especially during a period of intense interest in 
grant issues. Is not the law of federal grants too 
important to be left to the lawyers (and the courts)? 
Should not those who design, work with, and ana- 
lyze grant programs recognize the phenomenon and 
seek to influence it? 
To give the reader a sense of the type and magni- 
tude of the questions with which courts deal, the 
article begins with an analysis of three salient ques- 
tions in grant law:’ Can grantees overturn grant 
conditions, who can sue to enforce conditions, and 
what remedies are available? Next, the volume, 
causes, and possible impacts of grant litigation are 
considered. The article concludes with some mod- 
est proposals for change and for future study. 
Three Salient Issues in Grant Law 
Can Grantees Overturn Grant Conditions? 
Federal grants-even General Revenue Sharing- 
come with “strings” attached. Thus, there is always 
an inherent tension between the grantor’s desire 
to see funds expended in a certain way and the gran- 
tee’s desire for flexibility. However, federal strings 
extend far beyond the area of “how the money is 
spent” as that term is normally used. Receipt of 
federal funds can now affect virtually all facets of 
state and local government, ranging from organiza- 
tion and personnel practices, through concern for 
national values such as nondiscrimination, to the 
very processes of government itself. According to one 
analyst, the 
dynamic federal assistance area is where many of 
the most crucial issues confronting contemporary 
federalism arise, including the mandated “use” 
of states by the national government for some of 
its own regulatory purposes, a reliance on the 
spending power and the conditions that may be 
attached thereto to achieve regulatory purposes 
beyond the scope of the commerce power, and the 
use of grant conditions to force Constitutional and 
institutional changes in recipient governments. . . .* 
Recipients might chafe at such conditions, but any 
possibility of judicial relief seemed, until recently, 
blocked by the Supreme Court’s insistence that since 
participation in grant programs is voluntary, ob- 
jectionable conditions can be avoided by not partic- 
ipating. The Court first enunciated this principle in 
the 1923 case of Massachusetts v. Mellon,3 declar- 
‘The term “grant law” obviously encompasses more than a group of court 
decisions. It Includes statutes, regulations, and, arguably. a Set of general 
principles. This article focuses primarily on the functional role of the courts in 
the operation of the system, although the Constrtutional cases also illustrate 
the role of the courts in establishing underlying principles. 
ZDavid 8. Walker, Toward a Functioning Federalism, Cambridge. MA. Win- 
throp Publishers, 1981. p. 154. 
3262 U.S. 477 (1923) 

” However, states and local governments were 
Hffected as well. The Chief Justice noted that N.L.C. 
imposed limitations on the reach of the commerce 
power to these governments, but that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was an adequate source for this aspect 
of the program. For the purposes of this article, the 
key point is that three members of the Court cited 
N.L.C. as relevant to a discussion of the validity of 
a grant-in-aid condition. 
The issue surfaced again-and again, somewhat 
obliquely-in Pennhurst State School and Hospi- 
tal v. Halderman,‘” a 1981 case involving condi- 
tions at a state facility for the mentally retarded. 
The plaintiffs asserted federal Constitutional and 
statutory claims as well as claims based on state law. 
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the 
“bill of rights” provision of the Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act im- 
posed requirements on states participating in the 
program. 
It must be noted that the defendents did not con- 
test the validity of any condition but asserted that 
the bill of rights was separate from the Act’s condi- 
tions. Nonetheless, the majority noted “[tlhere are 
limits on the power of Congress to impose con- 
ditions on the states pursuant to its spending power 
. . . . ” The opinion cited the Chief Justice’s opinion 
in Fullilove as direct support for this proposition 
and also cited N.L.C. as general support. (In addi- 
tion, the Court cited an opinion by Justice Cardozo 
which suggested that inducement to participate in 
a program might reach the level of coercion.)‘” This 
discussion may be of limited precedential value since 
it is set forth in a footnote and is not directly rel- 
evant to the actual decision. Still, Supreme Court 
footnotes are often harbingers of things to come; and 
this particular statement may force lower courts to 
take more seriously challenges to grant conditions 
based on state sovereignty grounds. 
The Pennhurst “Clear Statement” Rule. The 
actual decision in Pennhurst suggests additional 
arguments which grantees may make in attacking 
conditions, particularly those imposed by grantor 
agencies. The Court held that the statute’s bill of 
rights was not one of the conditions which the Act 
imposed on grantees. The majority analyzed the 
grant device as “much in the nature of a contract 
. . . . ” Thus, 
The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate 
under the spending power rests on whether the 
state voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms 
of the “contract.” There can, of course, be no 
knowing acceptance if a state is unaware of the 
conditions or is unable to ascertain what is ex- 
pected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to 
impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, 
it must do so unambiguously. (Emphasis added, 
citations and footnotes omitted.) 
At this point, one can only speculate as to the im- 
“101 s ct. 1.531 (1981). 
8 ‘?3eward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548. 569-90 (1937) 
LL The actual decision in 
Pennhurst suggests additional 
arguments which grantees may 
make in attacking conditions, 
particularly those imposed by 
grantor agencies. 
YY 
pact of the Court’s “clear statement” rule. Since 
the opinion referred to the “legitimacy” of Congres- 
sional action, it may be that unclear or retroactive 
conditions will be invalidated, particularly if they 
would impose heavy financial burdens. Taken se- 
riously, this approach would call into question basic 
features of the grant system such as enactment of 
new cross-cutting conditions which apply to existing 
programs. (The Court did state that Congress cannot 
“surprise participating states with postacceptance 
or ‘retroactive’ conditions.“) It is more likely that, 
as in Pennhurst itself, the clear statement rule will 
be used as a canon of statutory construction. Thus, 
bills of rights, Congressional statements of policy, 
etc., will not be viewed as conditions at all, and ex- 
pressly stated conditions will be narrowly construed. 
Far more promising, from the grantee perspective, 
is the possibility that Pennhurst sets the stage for 
attacks on administrative implementation of grant 
strings-through regulations, guidelines, etc.-on the 
ground that the agency has imposed duties beyond 
those contained in the relevant statute itself. Of 
course, if the administrative interpretation is known 
at the time of acceptance of the grant, any argument 
based on contractual theory is substantially weak- 
ened.‘” It has been suggested that the Court’s cita- 
tions of 11th Amendment cases such as Edelman v. 
Jordan’” is significant, since these cases require 
“strong evidence” that a state has surrendered pre- 
rogatives of sovereignty, and that, by implication, 
this evidence must be found in the relevant statute.J7 
(It is not clear whether this analysis helps local gran- 
tees, whom the 11th Amendment does not protect.) 
Even before Pennhurst, courts were beginning to 
take a hard look at implementing regulations of 
grantor agencies, at times declaring them invalid.lX 
Pennhurst will surely add impetus to this develop- 
ment. In the words of one former regulator, “It is 
likely to provide a philosophical and legal basis for 
the re-examination and likely elimination of a broad 
range of terms and conditions in federal grant pro- 
Stewart Baker. “MakIng The Most of Pennhurst’s Cleat Statement RULE, 
p 4. (Paper prepared for the Center for State and Local Advocacy Project ln 
1981 On file with the author ) 
‘“415 U.S. 651 (1974) 
See Baker, supra, at 5-7. 
‘E.g.. lslesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F 24 424 (1st 0r.j 
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979) 
grams. . . . “I9 In a recent concurring opinion, Chief 
Justice Burger sent the lower federal courts a strong 
message along these very lines.20 
Who Can Sue? The Retreat from Thiboutot 
There are two major types of federal grant litiga- 
tion: grantor-grantee disputes and third party litiga- 
tion. Grantor-grantee disputes are usually initiated 
by grantees or would-be grantees and generally in- 
volve such matters as denial of a grant, reimburse- 
ment disputes, terminations, suspensions, and other 
fiscal issues. Although there has been an increase in 
such suits, the second category-third party suits- 
has primarily been responsible for the grant law ex- 
plosion. And these suits are the ones most affected 
by the question, who can sue? 
In third party suits, plaintiffs typically assert that 
they are beneficiaries either under a condition of the 
grant statute itself or a “cross-cutting” provision 
applicable to grants on a more general basis. Such 
plaintiffs frequently encounter “threshold” ob- 
stacles: that is, does this person have access to a fed- 
eral court to present his or her claim, apart from the 
merits of that claim as stated? A principal question 
is whether the plaintiffs have a “right (or cause) of 
action” to enforce duties created by the underlying 
statute. In the grant context, statutes usually say 
what the grantee must do in return for the funds but 
are silent as to third party judicial enforcement of 
these conditions. The norm is to provide for admin- 
istrative enforcement by the grantor agency itself. 
Frequently, courts have “implied” a private right of 
action by construing the statute as containing such a 
right, albeit not explicitly stated.2’ 
As an alternative, third party challengers have as- 
serted that, in the case of grants to governmental 
entities, 42 United States Code Section 1983 confers 
upon them an express right to enforce grant con- 
ditions. That statute provides that 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
state or territory, subjects, or causes to be sub- 
jected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the dep- 
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Plaintiffs have argued that since grant conditions 
are “laws” of the United States, any suit to enforce 
“Thomas Madden. “Enforceabrlrty of Grant Condrtrons. lmplicatrons of 
Supreme Court’s Decrsion rn Pennhurst Stale School v. Halderman,” Grants 
and Assistance News, Washrngton. DC, National Assistance Management 
Assocration. 4. July 1981. pp. 12-14 
-“Camenisch v. University of Texas, 101 S. Ct 1830.1835 (1981) (Burger. 
C J., concurrrng). 
E.g Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F 2d 1977 (7th C/r 
1977) Statutes frequently provrde duties to be enforced by a federal agency 
but are srlent as to whether Injured private parties may sue to enforce these 
duties Courts examrne the statute to determine if rmplyrng’ such a r!ght would 
be consrstent with Congress Intent 
them is covered by Section 1983. In its 1980 decision 
in Maine v. Thiboutot”-a third party grant suit- 
the Supreme Court appeared to accept this argument 
without qualification. The Court emphasized the 
“plain language” of Section 1983 and declined to 
limit it to any “subset” of laws. Many observers saw 
the decision as paving the way for a vast increase in 
suits and liabilities, including attorney’s fees. How- 
ever, two recent cases suggest strongly that the Court 
intends to step back from the plain language of 
Thiboutot and restrict the ability of third party 
challengers to bring suit. 
Pennhurst was precisely such a case. The Court, 
by a margin of 6 to 3, held that plaintiffs could not 
sue to enforce the statutory bill of rights, and re- 
manded the case for consideration of their claim that 
they could sue to enforce the assurances made by 
the grantee. Although that claim was not before the 
Court, Justice Rehnquist-for a five man majority- 
suggested several obstacles it might encounter. As far 
as threshold problems are concerned, he first raised 
the question whether the assurances could be con- 
sidered “rights” secured to the plaintiffs as required 
by Section 1983. He also noted that the underlying 
statute contained an express remedy-administrative 
imposition of fiscal sanctions-and suggested that 
this remedy might be considered exclusive, thereby 
precluding any Section 1983 suit. 
These statements are “dictum,” observations by 
the Court which were not necessary for it to reach 
its actual result. However, the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authori- 
ty v. National Sea Clammers Association’:j made 
it clear that they are more than straws in the wind. 
The case as it came to the Court did not involve Sec- 
tion 1983 at all. Plaintiffs claimed injury to fishing 
grounds from discharges and ocean dumping of sew- 
age and other waste. They asserted an implied right 
of action under the Federal Water Pollution Con- 
trol Act and the Marine Protection, Research, 
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. The Court rejected 
this argument on the ground that both statutes con- 
tained extensive enforcement mechanisms and that 
it was unlikely that Congress intended to create ad- 
ditional remedies. 
Justice Powell, joined by six other justices, also 
considered whether plaintiffs might invoke Section 
1983 against any state and local defendents in the 
case. He bowed in the direction of Thiboutot, but 
cited Pennhurst for the proposition that “[t]he 
Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of Section 1983 to statutory violations.” 
These exceptions are preclusion of any private en- 
forcement in the underlying statute itself and a lack 
of any rights secured to the plaintiffs in that statute. 
He found the first exception applicable, again re- 
lying on the elaborate enforcement procedures in the 
two statutes. 
~ 100s ct 2502 11980) 
“101 S Ct 2615 
These two decisions indicate a substantial retreat 
from Thiboutot. The Pennhurst statements may be 
dictum, but National Sea Clammers is a holding. 
The general question which it raises is to what ex- 
tent the two exceptions swallow up the rule and 
eliminate third party grant suits. 
The first exception is triggered if the remedy is 
sufficiently extensive to show Congressional intent 
to make it exclusive. The strongest case is that of 
citizens suits-express authorization for private en- 
forcement-such as contained in the revenue sharing 
statute,24 which afford the plaintiff some remedy. 
In the grant context the typical scheme is for admin- 
istrative enforcement only, with no mention of a 
private suit. In Pennhurst Justice Rehnquist sug- 
gested that this might be enough. However, such a 
conclusion could virtually wipe out the doctrine of 
implied rights of action, which grew up in precisely 
such a context, albeit involving regulatory statutes. 
As for grant suits, it would require a rethinking of 
the welfare cases brought by third parties, particu- 
larly Rosado v. Wymanz5 in which the Court 
stressed the value of private judicial enforcement. 
Obviously, the scope of the first exception will be a 
principal battleground in grant litigation for years 
to come. 
The operation of the second exception is harder 
to gauge. At what point do grant conditions-wheth- 
er program specific or cross-cutting-create rights? 
Antidiscrimination provisions fit, but the situation 
is less clear when one comes to preferences, bills of 
rights, statutory findings, and the like. Perhaps 
courts, looking to Pennhurst, will require a “clear 
statement” that a grant condition creates individual 
rights as well as duties on the part of the grantee. It 
is particularly significant that Justice Rehnquist 
suggested that assurances to the grantor might not 
create enforceable rights for plaintiffs.“” 
The net result of the two exceptions may be that 
the Section 1983 inquiry has become identical with 
implied right analysis. In the latter context the 
Supreme Court has focused on two factors: whether 
the plaintiff is an especial beneficiary of the under- 
lying statute, to the extent that it can be viewed as 
conferring rights upon him; and, whether the legis- 
lative history contains any evidence to provide or 
deny a private right of enforcement.27 The Court 
has been increasingly harsh on would-be implied 
right plaintiffs. There is growing reason to expect 
the same result in the Section 1983 context, Thi- 
boutot notwithstanding. 
What Remedies are Available? The Retreat from Cannon 
The question of what relief is appropriate arises 
most acutely in third party challenges to grantee 
practices. The conditions attached to federal grants, 
sometimes referred to as “mandates,” are not clearly 
distinguished from coercive exercises of federal reg- 
-31 U.S.C. 1244. 
25397 U.S. 397 (1970). 
10 
Z6But see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
*‘See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 101 S Ct. 1775 (1981). 
ulatory power. Yet it is far from clear whether Con- 
gress may utilize the spending power to impose any 
direct obligations.2* Many grant cases obscure the 
distinction as well. Courts have allowed remedies in 
the nature of specific performance;2g awarded dam- 
ages, e30 and held that state statutes inconsistent with 
the terms of federal grant statutes are invalid under 
the Supremacy Clause.31 
In many instances the plaintiff will not desire to 
block the flow of federal funds to the grantee, but to 
use a grant condition as leverage to force a change 
in the grantee’s conduct to benefit the plaintiff. An 
important decision in this respect is Cannon v. Uni- 
versity of Chicago,s2 where the plaintiff alleged sex 
discrimination in a federally aided education pro- 
gram. She based her complaint on Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits 
such conduct. The lower courts ruled that the statute 
afforded her no private right of action to enforce it. 
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the plural- 
ity, Justice Stevens drew a sharp distinction between 
administrative proceedings for termination of funds, 
and “the award of individual relief to a private liti- 
gant . . . . ” He characterized the former as “severe” 
and inappropriate in the case of an isolated violation. 
He reasoned that limiting the private plaintiff to 
a suit to compel the agency to commence enforce- 
ment proceedings would also be disruptive. He 
declared “unquestionably correct” the agency’s posi- 
tion that “the individual remedy will provide effec- 
tive assistance to achieving the statutory purposes.” 
It would make “little sense” to require a showing 
by plaintiff of discrimination that would warrant 
termination. 
All of this glosses over the questions of what plain- 
tiff does have to show and, more importantly, what 
remedy is appropriate. In particular, how does one 
reconcile “the award of individual relief’ with the 
fundamental doctrine laid down in the foundation 
cases that the grantee’s participation is voluntary? 
In other words, how can one treat voluntary partic- 
ipation as akin to adherence to a binding norm? 
Courts have, at times, seen these problems. Notably, 
in Rosado v. Wyman, Justice Harlan stated that 
the “unarticulated premise” in a third party chal- 
lenge was that the grantee had the choice of con- 
forming to the federal norm or giving up the federal 
funds. 
As Cannon illustrates, the Court’s approach to 
problems raised by the voluntariness doctrine is not 
always consistent, or even indicative of an awareness 
of them. However, in Pennhurst, Justice Rehnquist 
indicated that the Court is prepared to confront the 
remedial issues presented by third party challenges. 
Z8See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct 1531, 
1540, n. 13. 
ZgE.g.. Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F. 2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), va- 
cated, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981). 
%ee Richard Cappalli. “Federal Grants and the New Statutory Tort; State 
and Local Officials Beware. 1,” Urban Lawyer, 12 Summer 1980, p. 445. 
“‘E.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972). 
=441 U.S. 667 (1979) 
Lb . In many instances, the 
plaintiff will not desire to block the 
flow of federal funds to the grantee, 
but to use a grant condition as 
leverage to force a change in the 
grantee’s conduct.. . . 
w 
He stated that plaintiffs ’ “relief may well be limited 
to enjoining the federal government from providing 
funds to the Commonwealth.” This may mean either 
that no Section 1983 suit could be brought at all, 
or that private plaintiffs would have only remedies 
analogous to those available to the federal govern- 
ment: a declaration that the grantee is not in com- 
pliance, and an either/or decree that it alter its con- 
duct or forego federal funding for the activity in 
question.33 
Justice Rehnquist cited Rosado and admitted that 
subsequent decisions were not always consistent with 
it. It is also significant that the three dissenting jus- 
tices agreed with Justice Rehnquist on the remedial 
issue. In particular, Justice White disapproved of 
the lower court’s appointment of a special master 
with broad powers. Such remedies are frequent in 
Constitutional litigation. However, there the court 
is enforcing a binding norm, and the element of “opt- 
ing out” is not available. Pennhurst forces courts 
to make this distinction when considering the re- 
medial aspects of a third party grant challenge. Once 
again, its influence on future grant litigation is likely 
to be profound. 
Grant Litigation: Volume, Causes, and Impacts 
Grant law-more precisely, grant litigation-is 
clearly a “hot” area. The growing volume of cases 
involves issues which are highly complex and signif- 
icant to the operation of the grant system. 
“A Veritable Explosion” 
The rising tide of lawsuits generated by federal 
grant programs and their administration has been 
documented. As early as 1972, Professors Frank 
Michelman and Terrance Sandalow reported a 
“veritable explosion” in grant challenges by third 
parties.34 In a 1976 analysis of litigation under the 
Housing and Community Development Act, Prof. 
Richard Kushner reported that “[mlore legal chal- 
lenges have been made in the first year of the [Hous- 
ing and Community Development Act] than under 
33The federal government has an additional remedy. specific performance 
to enforce the assurances during their term. See United States v. Marion Coun- 
ty School District, 625 F. 2d 607 (5th Cir. 1980). 
j”Frank I. Mlchelman and Terrance Sandalow, Government In Urban 
Areas, Supplement. St. Paul. MN, West Publishing, 1972, p. 275. 
the past decade of urban renewal and categorical 
grants.“35 Others have described and analyzed the 
growing judicial role in grant programs. 
However, it was not until 1979 that an attempt 
was made to compile and classify all reported grant 
decisions. This “Survey of the Caselaw Relating to 
Federal Grant Programs” is one of a series of working 
papers in the Office of Management and Budget’s 
Study of Federal Assistance Management Pur- 
suant to the Federal Grant and Cooperative 
Agreement Act of 1977 (P.L. 95224).3” It was pre- 
pared under the direction of Thomas Madden, then 
General Counsel of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration. The survey is an exceptionally val- 
uable research tool for lawyers and others working 
in the field. 
Even this effort was not comprehensive, however. 
The authors themselves acknowledged that 
the document is not complete and that there are 
areas of grant law which are not fully covered. Our 
intent when this project began was to collect all 
of the caselaw relating to federal grant programs. 
Our best estimate was that there were no more 
than 200 cases in the area. When we ended our 
search, we had discovered over 500 cases, and we 
estimate that there are still more to be discovered. 
It is probably impossible to calculate with any 
precision the number of decided grant cases, let alone 
those that are filed but settled or otherwise disposed 
of along the way. For example, many important dis- 
trict court cases are simply not reported at all. None- 
theless, it seems clear that the OMB researchers were 
correct in concluding that the volume of cases was 
far greater than previously realized. Moreover, it 
seems equally clear that the number of cases is in- 
creasing.37 
Why are grantors, grantees, and third parties turn- 
ing, in ever increasing numbers, to the federal courts 
for resolution of grant disputes? A simple explanation 
of the phenomenon might be that as the volume of 
grant dollars increased, a parallel increase in grant 
related suits was to be expected, especially in a lit- 
igious society such as ours. The real reasons are 
somewhat more complex, however. They can be 
found, to some extent, in changing doctrines of fed- 
eral jurisdiction, which have expanded judicial access 
generally. Other causes lie within the grant system 
itself. 
Judicial Developments and the Grant Litigation Explosion 
The judicial doctrinal developments have received 
considerable attention in the legal literature and will 
35Richard Kushner. “Lltlgatlon Strategies and Judlclal Rewew Under Title 
I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974,” Urban Law An- 
nual, 11, 1976, pp. 37-96. 
JbOffice of Management and Budget, Managing Federal Assistance in the 
198Os, Working Paper A-7, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
1979. 
37Thomas Madden, “The Law of Federal Grants” in Advisory Commlsslon 
on Intergovernmental Relations. Awakening the Slumbering Giant: tntergovern- 
mental Relations and Federal Grant Law, M-122, Washington. DC, U.S Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, 1980, pp. 9-10. 
be dealt with only briefly. ‘I‘he important pomt here 
is that the three traditional judicial constraints or 
barriers-standing, right of action and exhaustion 
of remedies-have in recent years been relaxed con- 
siderably. As a result, the floodgates of grant litiga- 
tion have been opened even wider. 
Standing. Standing is a flexible-some might say 
manipulable-concept. To have standing to sue in 
federal court a plaintiff must demonstrate harm, 
causal nexus between that harm and the defendant’s 
conduct, and some likelihood that judicial interven- 
tion will alleviate the situation. In the mid-1970s the 
Court appeared to be turning standing into a formid- 
able barrier, particularly for litigants who com- 
plained of harm at the hands of someone other than 
the defendant. However, recent Supreme Court de- 
cisions have taken a much less restrictive approach, 
requiring, for example, only that a favorable ruling 
be “likely” to benefit the plaintiff.38 The lower courts 
have generally followed the Court’s lead in grant 
suits and other contexts. 
Right (or Cause) of Action. In the late 1970s 
this obstacle also became a good deal less threaten- 
ing, as courts were frequently willing to imply a 
right to sue from the underlying statute. The prin- 
cipal cause of this development is the Supreme 
Court’s 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash.sg The Court 
laid out four factors which determine whether to 
imply a private right of action: whether the statute 
creates particular benefits or rights in favor of the 
plaintiff; the bearing, if any, of legislative history; 
the effect of private suits on enforcement of the stat- 
ute; and whether the subject matter is federal or 
one traditionally left to state law. The lower courts 
have applied Cort very liberally in the grant con- 
text, primarily because of the wide range of benefits 
and rights which grant programs and cross-cutting 
conditions create. Alternatively, the decision in Thi- 
boutot appeared to remove even the need for this in- 
quiry, since third parties suing state and local gran- 
tees could rely on Section 1983. 
Exhaustion of Remedies and Primary Jurisdic- 
tion. These interrelated doctrines express a judicially 
created preference for the administrative process 
as the first point of recourse when a plaintiffs claims 
are either against an agency or lie within an agency’s 
special expertise. It might be expected that courts 
would invoke them frequently in third party chal- 
lenges to grantee practices. By and large, this has 
not been the case. A principal reason has been the 
Court’s view that the grievance procedures offered 
to third parties are inadequate. The Supreme Court 
in Cannon emphasized the fact that the complainant 
could not participate in the process. The courts seem 
to feel that requiring recourse to the administrative 
process would defeat the purpose of allowing a pri- 
vate, third party suit. It is not clear why this should 
be so, especially if the grantor agency does have 
“E.g.. Regeflts of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
2 -422 U S 66 (1975) 
something to contribute. No doubt agency ambiva- 
lence on this issue has influenced the judges in this 
direction. 
Other elements contributing to the upsurge in 
grant litigation include judicial and legislative re- 
laxation and ultimate abolition of the $10,000 min- 
imum in federal question cases, and the growing 
availability of attorney’s fees in grant cases. Still, 
it is also necessary to consider changes within the 
grant system itself. 
The Evolving Grant System As Generator of 
More Litigation 
The major change which is most clearly related to 
grant litigation is the proliferation of the cross-cut- 
ting or national policy conditions. These create sub- 
stantial new clusters of interests-and interest 
groups-with which a grantee must reckon. Mem- 
bers of these interest groups-such as the handi- 
capped and environmentalists-are frequently well 
organized and both willing and able to take judicial 
action. Frequently, they have the assistance of high- 
ly specialized “back-up centers” with great expertise 
in the relevant area. Third party challenges based on 
asserted violations of the cross-cutting conditions are 
probably the biggest single growth area within the 
overall field of grant litigation. At the same time, the 
rapid growth of these cross-cutting conditions may 
well be a principal cause of current dissatisfaction 
with the system. If so, the availability of the federal 
courts as enforcers has important systemic conse- 
quences. 
The volume of third party challenges based on pro- 
gram specific conditions, which prescribe how the 
money is to be spent, is growing as well. A good ex- 
ample is the body of caselaw under the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act, based primar- 
ily on the act’s condition that participating states 
provide all children a “free, appropriate public edu- 
cation.” Thus, it is the case that an increase in grant 
programs-as opposed to grant dollars-will gen- 
erate more litigation. The point is that here-as in 
the case of the cross-cutting conditions-Congress 
has created new interests which can claim judicial 
protection. 
As far as the rise in grantor-grantee disputes is 
concerned, Prof. Richard B. Cappalli cites the fol- 
lowing factors, in addition to judicial developments: 
(1) the change in thinking about the grant from 
the concept of a gift to that of an entitlement; (2) 
the ever increasing complexity of the grant, as 
Congress adds more “strings”. . .; (3) tremendous 
expansion of the world of grantees, primarily 
through the extension of various grants to thou- 
sands of local governments and special districts; 
(4) movement away from discretionary grants to 
formula entitlements, thereby lessening grantor 
leverage over grantee behavior. . . .4O 
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The first and fourth factors are perhaps the most 
significant, in terms of grantee willingness to “fight 
back.” The earlier, highly discretionary grant system 
was exceedingly one-sided and contained the poten- 
tial for unbridled exercises of discretion relatively 
immune from judicial scrutiny. The present system, 
dominated by formula based programs, creates a 
sense of entitlement: and since federal funds are an 
increasingly significant component of state and local 
budgets, any potential loss is now likely to be con- 
tested vigorously. 
In sum, the judicial and systemic developments 
have interacted: Congress has created a plethora of 
new rights during a period when the federal courts 
have been increasingly receptive to the assertion of 
claims based on federal law. The obvious result has 
been the explosion of grant litigation. What is not 
obvious is what the effects of this explosion may be 
on the operation of the system itself. 
Impacts of the Explosion 
Attempts at an across-the-board assessment of the 
impact of grant litigation must be somewhat judg- 
mental and subjective. In any given case it may be 
possible to identify specific results, but the state 
of the art does not permit empirically based general 
conclusions. Nonetheless, the subject would appear 
to warrant some consideration, if only because of 
the pervasive presence of the courts as actors in the 
operation of grant programs.“’ Since the systemic 
consequences of grantor-grantee suits may be quite 
different from those of third party suits, the effects 
will be considered separately. 
Grantor-Grantee Litigation. Some analysts view 
the recent increase in grantor-grantee litigation as 
unhealthy. For example, the Office of Management 
and Budget has stated that “[t]he number of dis- 
putes between federal assistance agencies and re- 
cipients is growing apace with the growing impor- 
tance and complexity of federal assistance. Not only 
is this costly, it is disrupting what should be partner- 
ships to get things done.“A2 In a similar vein, Prof. 
Cappelli has argued that the judicial forum is in- 
adequate, noting that the courts are “confined in the 
review function,” that the decision may at best in- 
volve a remand, and that suits are costly and time- 
consuming.43 He concludes that the “ultimate dis- 
advantage is the hostility which litigation engen- 
ders,” and expresses a strong preference for the ad- 
ministrative process. 
On the other hand, one can make the case that 
going to court is perhaps only another step, albeit a 
painful one, in an ongoing relationship and that the 
ability of grantees to sue obviously introduces an 
element of equalization into the relationship. The 
e’The role which courts play in establishing the Constitutional parameters 
of grant programs--ln cases such as those discussed earlier-has received 
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ACIR appears to have accepted this position as early 
as 1964;44 and a number of federal statutes autho- 
rize appeals by grantees from adverse financial de- 
cisions.45 Availability of the judicial forum is par- 
ticularly important in cases where the grantee is 
attacking the grantor’s interpretation or the statute 
itself. 
Third Party Challenges. The arguments in favor 
of suits by third parties attacking the award or ad- 
ministration of federal grants appear to be substan- 
tially stronger. Justice Harlan’s opinion in Rosado 
v. Wyman, suggests two purposes which such suits 
further: making certain that Congress’ will is not 
ignored by grantees, and protecting the individual 
beneficiaries of federal aid programs. These justifi- 
cations overlap but can be examined separately. 
Congress attaches conditions to federal aid in order 
to achieve what it perceives as national objectives. 
The very presence of any string-program specific or 
cross-cutting-represents a potential displacement 
of the grantee’s freedom to choose, in that the gran- 
tee might well not have chosen to follow the course 
of conduct “mandated” by the string. That is why 
Congress imposed the condition in the first place. 
Yet the grantee may wish to evade or disobey grant 
conditions due to a desire to cut costs, a legitimate 
disagreement over how best to operate a program, or 
an outright desire to convert federal dollars to uses 
other than those intended by Congress. Thus, al- 
lowing third parties to sue to enforce grant conditions 
is an essential tool to help keep the grantee honest. 
It is also important to focus on the types of person 
likely to bring such suits. In many instances, they 
will be individuals or groups with little clout in the 
grantee’s political processes. Examples include wel- 
fare recipients such as the Thiboutot plaintiffs, ra- 
cial minorities, classes such as the handicapped, low 
income persons generally, or those promoting a local- 
ly unpopular cause such as environmental protec- 
tion. A fundamental premise which underlies much 
of the present grant system is that state and local 
governments cannot be counted on to respond ade- 
quately to such interests. Thus, third party grant 
suits represent one more instance of the federal 
courts serving as “the primary and powerful reli- 
antes for vindicating every right given by the Consti- 
tution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.“d6 
On the other hand, it may be that third party suits 
contribute to the “overload” which ACIR has iden- 
tified as a principal problem of the present grant 
system. The Commission argues that problems of 
effectiveness, efficiency, costliness, and accountabil- 
ity are widespread. Third party suits can contribute 
to the cost of participating in grant programs. There 
are the costs of defending the suit, increased project 
costs in case of delays, possible attorney’s fees, and 
“dAdvlsory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Statutory and Ad- 
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even damages. Third party suits also contribute to 
the complexity and uncertainty of administering 
federal aid programs. Grantees are likely to insist on 
elaborate federal guidance and refrain from innova- 
tion out of fear of being hauled into court. Accounta- 
bility issues also emerge, increasing the opportunity 
for finger pointing and buck passing. To the extent 
that participation in grant programs becomes more 
and more unattractive, the phenomenon of opting 
out is likely to increase. 
Grant suits can also frustrate the achievement 
of program goals. Take the case of an economic de- 
velopment project involving federal, local, and pri- 
vate funds, which is attacked on the grounds of in- 
adequate citizen participation. If the court agrees 
with plaintiffs and grants an injunction, the resul- 
tant delay will drive up costs. The public funds may 
no longer be sufficient. The developer may pull out. 
Which would Congress have preferred: the project 
without the participation, or the participation with- 
out the project? The court is not in any position to 
make such trade-offs. It must enforce the grant con- 
ditions as they are written. 
In sum, grant litigation, of whatever variety, raises 
serious institutional questions. Are the various forms 
of judicial involvement a good thing? Until now the 
question has largely been unasked, perhaps because 
the explosion is recent, perhaps because many of 
those working on grant reform are not lawyers and 
are understandably perplexed by arcane concepts of 
federal jurisdiction. Yet the role of the courts seems 
too important not to be addressed. 
The Courts and Grant Reform: 
A Time for Action 
One can argue that a conscious decision should 
be made not to address the issue of courts and grant 
reform-to leave it to the lawyers and the courts after 
all. Indeed, cases such as Pennhurst indicate the 
possibility of judicial self correction. However, if the 
system is in need of reform-a point generally con- 
ceded-that effort ought to at least consider the role 
of this important, and relatively new, actor: the fed- 
eral judiciary. (Although the recently enacted block 
grants may alter the fiscal and political landscape, 
there is no indication that the judicial role will be 
significantly altered.) 
Short of Congressional action, the grantor agencies 
might develop accessible and workable grievance pro- 
cedures. Agency practice in this area varies tremen- 
dously but, in general, the administrative avenues 
available are not viewed as adequate. (Plaintiffs 
sometimes “exhaust” them anyway, just to be on 
the safe side.) The availability of such procedures 
might lead to the resolution of a large number of 
disputes in a forum more susceptible to negotiation 
and mediation than a lawsuit. Moreover, the courts 
would be far more willing to invoke the doctrines of 
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies 
14 than they are at present. 
Still, the primary responsibility rests with Con- 
gress. It would be virtually impossible to address the 
issue of the role of the courts in any across-the-board 
legislation. The grant programs are simply too 
varied, and the disputes they generate too dissimilar. 
Block grants present different issues than categori- 
ical programs. It makes a difference whether one is 
talking about suits to enforce the cross-cutting con- 
ditions, or program specific strings. Many different, 
and difficult, value judgements have to be made. 
Allegations of racial discrimination in a grant pro- 
gram are more serious candidates for federal judicial 
review than claims by disappointed vendors that the 
grantee has violated contractual obligations, while 
claims of insufficient citizen participation lie some- 
where in between. At the moment it is the courts 
which make these judgments, on an ad hoc basis. 
Ideally, the role of the courts ought to be addressed 
specifically each time the Administration and the 
Congress deal with restructuring or reauthorizing 
each grant program. It shouid be possible to identify 
in advance the types of third-party disputes which a 
given program will generate. Policymakers could 
then decide which should be insulated from judicial 
review, which should receive limited judicial review, 
and which should receive whole-scale review of the 
sort awarded in most third party suits as things 
stand now. For example, citizen participation is- 
sues might be resolved using agency forums, while 
complaints of racial or sexual discrimination would 
still be able to be heard in the courts, perhaps after 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. So far, this 
has happened only occasionally. The most notable 
example is the General Revenue Sharing Amend- 
ments of 1976, which created an elaborate citizens 
suit provision including a complaint mechanism and 
an exhaustion requirement. 
As a first step, then, those who deal with grant 
reform must add the role of the courts to the agenda, 
recognizing it as a new item. Empirical research is 
needed to bring to light the judicial impact on cate- 
gories and subcategories of grant disputes. 
The ultimate policy decisions will no doubt rest 
primarily on a balancing of the relative values ac- 
corded to the programmatic and federalism goals to 
be served by any federal grant statute, and the rights 
and interests of the individuals affected by such pro- 
grams. The task is not easy; the trade-offs are dif- 
ficult. Nonetheless, these issues have been simmering 
just beneath the surface for some time now. An hon- 
est dialogue will be necessary to arrive at an ade- 
quate resolution. At the very least, it is time for the 
dialogue to begin. 
George D. Brown is professor at Boston College 
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